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This very short book is a reprinting of the two articles in which Hohfeld explained his 
eight types of legal relations: Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16, and Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710. The 
book also contains a Forward by Arthur L Corbin, and an Introduction by Walter 
Wheeler Cook (itself reprinted from (1919) 28 Yale Law Journal 721).  
 
Hohfeld died in 1918 without ever finishing his planned book on analytical 
jurisprudence.
1
 Fundamental Legal Conceptions was an attempt to make his work 
more widely available, a service perhaps more effectively achieved now by 
HeinOnline. Hohfeld is usually remembered in connection with the eight legal 
relations he described, and the associated analysis of legal problems using them. This 
association is so strong that he has become eponymous in such expressions as 
“Hohfeldian power”. The legal relations were first outlined publicly in a footnote (n 
33) in an article: The Relations Between Equity and Law, (1913) 11 Michigan Law 
Review 537; which was largely comprised of a synopsis produced by Hohfeld for his 
students, in other words in a note on his teaching materials.  
 
Two aspects of Hohfeld’s work are prominent in this short tale of a book engendered 
by a jurist who struggled to finish what he was writing. Hohfeld developed the 
analysis for practical purposes, and he developed it to be used for solving practical 
legal problems. 
 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions is essentially an expansion of a note to teaching 
materials, a note that became a two-part article that took four years to publish. This 
suggests Hohfeld developed his analysis because he needed it to explain the 
relationship between law and equity to his students. To explain this relationship it was 
necessary to discriminate clearly between law and equity. To discriminate clearly 
between law and equity it was necessary to come to an understanding of the nature of 
legal and more challengingly equitable property interests. The analytical framework 
was not produced for aesthetic or grandiose intellectual reasons, it was not an attempt 
to find the hallmark of ultimate truth and justice.
2
 Rather, Hohfeld seems to have been 
faced with a familiar desperation, caused by trying to explain something that felt 
obvious to the orator, and yet was patently not at all obvious to the audience. Hohfeld 
found the language available to him inadequate to the task. His words betrayed him 
both through unintended ambiguity and inadequacy of discrimination. He was 
wrestling with language that could not discriminate between legal relations that had 
significant dissimilarities in a clear and consistent manner, language that produced 
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 Hohfeld was not trying to determine any necessary features of the legal system, he was not trying to 
do what Hillel Steiner was trying to do in An Essay on Rights (1994) Oxford. Hohfeld was not seeking 
“elementary particles of justice”, his legal conceptions were “fundamental” because they were, he 
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confusion and misunderstanding.  Hohfeld wanted simplicity and economy in the 
relationship between technical expression and legal relation, one word to denote each 
legal thing. Overly broad ideas and language produced an apparent simplicity of 
statement, but only by hiding the unresolved ambiguity. Hohfeld needed the kind of 
simplicity that made the true legal situation and the available legal choices visible 
through precision of expression and analysis.  
 
This practical genesis of the analysis, is consonant with the second aspect of 
Hohfeld’s work, a consistent emphasis on the practical value of the analysis. Both are 
confirmed by the Introduction and the articles themselves.
3
 Hohfeld aimed to provide 
a tool, and the value of a tool is measured by its usefulness. The Forward confirms 
Hohfeld’s conviction that his analysis was necessary if the law was to be understood. 
It also confirms that Hohfeld found it hard to gauge what his students would consider 
a reasonable scholastic load.
4
 A full analysis of any legal situation using Hohfeld’s 
legal relations is laborious. Although it is mere supposition, upon re-reading Hohfeld, 
it is hard not to feel that one reason he did not publish more was that his analysis 
always lent itself to further elaboration. He felt it was necessary to classify and 
portray the familiar legal environment in his own terminology before he could 
commence his analysis. His introductory remarks, setting up the analysis that formed 
the focus of his enquiry could easily exceed in quantity the analysis itself.
5
 Even more 
threateningly the preparatory account of the law could reveal the desirability of 
restating neighbouring areas of law in order to fully contextualise the research. 
Hohfeld showed a characteristic tendency to struggle with the necessary task of 
selection of material that needed to be dealt with. Death intervened before the 
definitive account of his analytical method was ready for publication in book form. 
One wonders if a more selective elaboration of legal problems might have allowed for 
the production of more completed analyses. Perhaps Hohfeld suffered from a 
compulsion to continue his analysis beyond the practically useful, in an attempt to 
reach a state of intellectual fulfilment. If so his distress has equipped us with a 
technical vocabulary of elegance and power. 
 
Before considering the familiar account of “jural relations” it is worth noting where 
Hohfeld started his analytical endeavour. Hohfeld started by distinguishing factual 
from legal relations; this conflation of fact and law continues unabated to the present. 
A piece of paper is described as a contract, a collision in a road as a tort, a house is 
described as the subject matter of property. Things, people, and the actions people 
perform are physical phenomena. The reasons people offer for their actions are 
psychical phenomena. Law is concerned with events, but law is not the same as those 
events. A contract is the set of legal consequences that flow from the existence of an 
enforceable agreement; a tort is present if the law imposes damages in the 
circumstances in which a collision took place; one does not own a house (a physical 
thing) one has various rights (legal relations i.e. claims, privileges, liberties, 
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immunities) in relation to the estate (a legal thing) that relates (a metaphysical 
conception) to the place (a physical thing) the house occupies. Hohfeld’s distinction is 
clearly correct and equally clearly tedious and capable of causing confusion if 
invariably insisted upon. Hohfeld proceeds with a distinction between different types 
of fact, distinguishing operative facts, facts that are in issue, and evidential facts. 
Briefly, operative facts are those that determine legal relations, and are specific or 
particular. Facts in issue are generic in nature, and will be established through the 
proof of specific operative facts. Evidential facts are those proved before the court 
determining the case. Of most interest in this passage on facts is Hohfeld’s treatment 
of such terms as “possession” and “domicile”. He describes such terms as sets of 
operative facts that have a legal effect, one might say patterns of operative facts that 
produce some legal effect. With this exercise in discrimination complete Hohfeld has 
provided clear indications of the nature of “jural” things, and he starts his explanation 
of “fundamental jural relations”. 
 
Hohfeld was trying to establish the identities of the most basic of legal relations, from 
which all complex legal relationships must be constructed. To use a philosophical and 
scientific analogy, he sought the identity and nature of the atomic particles that are 
combined to make legal substance. Obviously, this enterprise rests upon a number of 
assumptions, and it is as well to quickly note a few of them. First, it rests upon the 
assumption that legal relations exist; that it makes sense to speak of a person having a 
claim over another person who has a duty to comply. That duty and claim are 
meaningful words that describe something in the real world. Second, it rests upon the 
assumption that legal relations have generic qualities; that a claim has features that it 
shares with other claims. That claims and duties with different substantive content 
share some significant features because each is a claim, and each is associated with a 
correlative duty. Third, it rests upon the assumption that the structure of legal 
relationships is atomic in nature, rather than organic or emergent. This assumption, 
that complex legal relationships are made up of simpler elements, and it is in the 
combination and arrangement of these simpler relations that complex legal 
relationships are built up, is essential t the validity of Hofeldian analysis. In short, the 
search for fundamental legal relations only makes sense in a legal world that accepts 
the utility of speaking of legal entities (reductionism not appropriate) that have 
characteristics that are generic (generalisation is appropriate) and can be analysed into 
component basic parts (reductionism is appropriate). Hohfeld derived his level of 
analysis (he identified when one should reduce terms down to simpler terms) and his 
working assumptions (of generality and independent existence) from legal practice, 
probably intuitively. This explains his anxious and consistent justification of his 
analysis through the citation and analysis of judgments. 
 
We can notice the sort of benefits that Hohfeld hoped could be derived from the use 
of his analysis. First, if the fundamental terms are truly fundamental then they provide 
an interpretive tool of great potential power. Apparently dissimilar areas of law can be 
linked, through identification of shared characteristics at this fundamental level. In 
effect the analysis provides a lowest common denominator, one that allows for a 
simplified and transparent comparison of different legal situations, without the loss of 
useful information or distortion of the situation. Use of this common denominator is 
able to reveal connections, and suggest the applicability of common solutions to 
common problems. Second, if the fundamental terms are generally adopted then 
common verbal disagreements can be resolved. It is no small matter in law to avoid 
discourse that is barren because the vocabularies of each party do not correspond. 
Hohfeld hoped he was supplying a universally acceptable terminological framework. 
Finally, by stripping law of metaphor and colourful characterisation, and reducing 
matters to their constituent parts, it might be easier to make necessary value choices 
consciously and deliberately, rather than as the result of a rhetorical packaging of 
description, and analysis, with value choices. It is often the classification of a legal 
problem that determines the result of litigation. There is a risk of becoming committed 
to a particular solution at an early stage of argument, and without a clear apprehension 
of the alternatives. Reduction of the opposing claims into their fundamental 
components should make this sort of pre-judging less likely to occur. 
 
Hohfeld did not try to define his fundamental legal relations. This was surely an 
inspired methodological decision. Instead of attempting definitions Hohfeld described 
the legal relations and their inter-relationships, and gave examples of them from legal 
practice. He was thus able to develop his analytical framework from the social 
practice of the courts and jurists. It is justified not by any a priori justification, but as 
a reflection and refinement of law as it actually exists. This enabled him to achieve 
several ends without getting mired in arguments about definitions. He was able to 
give a convincing account of his eight component relations, producing his famous 
tables of opposites and correlatives. The schema is compelling because it does give a 
logically coherent and complete account.
6
 He was able to produce examples of each 
of his legal relations from judgments that proved that each existed in the corpus of 
positive law. He was able to produce a technical vocabulary that demonstrably 
allowed for greater discrimination than the vocabulary used in legal practice. He 
could demonstrate that with his proposed terminology it was possible to say 
everything that the old vocabulary allowed, and in addition it was possible to make 
more precise discriminations. He was able to demonstrate that his new terminology 
allowed for a more complete and precise description of the law than the technical 
terminology in general use. In other words, he established that his fundamental 
conceptions were not jargon (words coined for rhetorical effect or deliberate 
obscurity) but genuinely a technical vocabulary (a specialist vocabulary required to 
describe a technically complex area of activity). As has been noted all of this was 
possible by using description supported by authoritative example from judicial 
reasoning, a method that allowed the analysis to be established on a foundation of 
legal practice. 
 
Hohfeld did not think he had finished when he introduced and explained his eight 
fundamental jural relations. He had established an adequate technical vocabulary that 
would enable him to start his analysis. The issue he was concerned to analyse was the 
relationship between law and equity. In order to carry out this analysis he needed to 
consider what was meant by rights (privileges, powers etc) and actions in rem and in 
personam. Hohfeld suggested that greater clarity could be obtained by dividing rights 
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(privileges, powers etc) into those that were enforceable against one or a few people, 
rights he described as paucital (rights enforceable against individuals); and rights 
(privileges, powers etc) that were enforceable against a large number of people, rights 
that he described as multital (rights good against the world at large). Of multital rights 
some arose and existed in reference to property, and these were what might be termed 
property rights. Thus, in Hohfeld’s terms when jurists used the expression: “in rem” 
they often intended “multital rights (powers etc) existing in relation to some item of 
property”. Any right (power etc) must have some individual person who was subject 
to the correlative duty (liablitity etc), and multital rights were no different in this 
respect to any other rights, there were no such legal relations as rights (powers) 
enforceable against large and indefinite group, the law simply reiterated the same 
right duty many times. Also, the nature of a right (power etc) was not determined by 
the form of proceedings or remedies available for its enforcement. Thus, a mutital 
right relating to a chattel was no less a property right because specific recovery of the 
chattel might not be available in vindication of the right. The remedial right would 
invariably be paucital in nature, but the secondary right (power etc) should not be 
confused with primary right (power etc) it vindicated. Hohfeld did not have space to 
proceed with his analyses any further, and in particular did not manage to deal with 
common and special relations; or, consensual and constructive (imposed by law) 
relations; or, substantive and adjectival relations – although as noted he touched on 
this subject; or, perfect and imperfect relations (which it must be confessed remain a 
puzzle); or, concurrent and exclusive relations (which were at the heart of his analysis 
of the relationship between the law and equity).  
 
At the end of the short book (or the two articles) the reader is aware of several things. 
First, that Hohfeld could elaborate a problem apparently indefinitely. Second, that in 
the process of elaboration numerous false arguments were exposed as absurd. Third, 
that the task of elaboration invited a whole new range of errors of classification. In 
short, it is easy to understand why Hohfeld’s methodology has not been generally 
adopted. His rebellious students had a valid objection to subjecting the whole corpus 
of law to his analysis. However, those students who later reported that the time they 
had spent under Hohfeld had been the most useful of their academic careers were also 
right.
7
 The ability to break down a complex legal situation into its constituent legal 
parts, the fundamental legal conceptions of Hohfeld, does reveal absurd errors of 
reasoning. It can also reveal the possibility of alternative solutions when it is argued 
that choice is limited to one path or another, for example that either personal or 
property rights are in issue (either in personam or in rem). Consider, obviously it is 
not contradictory to allow a right to a claimant whilst denying a power to the same 
claimant; nor is it contradictory to allow a right to have multital effects but be 
ineffective with regard to a sub-group; nor is it contradictory to allow a paucital 
(personal) remedy for the violation of a multital (property) right. Familiarity with 
Hohfeld allows one to deconstruct legal relations, and examine them without 
distracting preconceptions created by linguistic choice – he provides a universal 
terminology adequate to any legal relationship.  
 
Hohfeld has survived for the best part of 100 years. He has been influential in the 
common law world, and has informed later jurists who have been able to break out of 
an undifferentiated world of rights in things or against people. He has provided a 
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vocabulary adequate to the description of the common law legal relations. However, 
his terminology has never achieved the level of usage that would make it the lingua 
franca of the legal world. It is too precise, too difficult to apply, too verbose. Reading 
this little book remains worthwhile today; it is short and stunningly disciplined in its 
approach to language. It is shorter than most government consultation documents, and 
far more likely to repay the time spent reading it. Re-reading it was valuable, one 
forgets just how much of Hohfeld becomes part of the mental context in which legal 
problems are considered, and how much was missed or neglected on first reading. 
Hohfeld knew that his analytical framework could not solve legal problems. It was 
meant to allow legal problems to be seen clearly. His analysis is most useful in two 
distinct situations: when one senses an error in reasoning but struggles to locate it; and 
when one cannot apprehend clearly the available legal responses to a problem. When 
one needs the precision in analysis and ability to discriminate that Hohfeld supplies 
then nothing else will serve.  
 
Graham Ferris and Erika Kirk, Nottingham Law School 
 
 
 
  
